Duane L. Adams v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

18-35212United States Court Of Appeals For The 9th Circuit16 avr. 2020

Texte intégral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DUANE L. ADAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-35212

D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00012-BMM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 15, 2020
**

Before: LEAVY, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Duane L. Adams appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

APR 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-35212
F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The ALJ’s interpretation of the treatment notes of treating physician Dr.
Baker was reasonable, and Adams has not demonstrated that Dr. Baker assessed
limitations greater than those considered in the ALJ’s determination of residual
functional capacity. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005)
(we will affirm the ALJ’s determination of RFC if the ALJ applied the proper legal
standard and his decision is supported by substantial evidence).
The ALJ gave specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting
Adams’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms, including that it was
not supported by the longitudinal objective medical record, and that Adams’s
testimony was inconsistent with his reports to medical providers. See Rollins v.
Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony
cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective
medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the
severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”); Morgan v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1999) (contradictory and
inconsistent statements to health care providers are clear and convincing reasons
for discounting a claimant’s symptom testimony).
The ALJ properly gave germane reasons for discounting the opinions of
physical therapist Grossman, nurse practitioner Maxwell, and counselor Bottomly.

3 18-35212
See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (an ALJ may discount
“other source” evidence by offering any reason that is “germane” to the opinion).
The ALJ gave minimal weight to all three opinions due to inconsistency with other
evidence in the treatment record. Id. at 1111-12 (inconsistency with objective
evidence is a germane reason).
As to Adams’s argument that the hypothetical question posed to the
vocational expert did not incorporate all his limitations, the ALJ is not required to
incorporate opinion evidence that was permissibly discounted. See Batson v.
Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
We reject as without merit Adams’s contention that the district court
violated his equal protection or due process rights in the application of District of
Montana Local Rule 78.2(c)(2) concerning briefing requirements.
AFFIRMED.

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