United States v. 2020-04-14 | 16-72619 | ARMANDO TOPETE SANCHEZ V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARMANDO TOPETE SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 16-72619

Agency No. A201-237-830

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 7, 2020
**

Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Armando Topete Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law,

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

APR 14 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that
deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and
regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review
for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453
F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny in part and dismiss in part the
petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Topete
Sanchez failed to establish the harm he experienced in Mexico was on account of a
protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an
applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). The
BIA did not err in finding that Topete Sanchez’s proposed returnee-based social
group was not cognizable. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir.
2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he
applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); see also Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059-60
(9th Cir. 2019) (finding that individuals returning to Mexico from the United States
who are believed to be wealthy does not constitute a particular social group). To

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the extent Topete Sanchez raises in his opening brief a particular social group
based, in part, on gender, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Barron v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review
claims not presented to the agency). Thus, Topete Sanchez’s withholding of
removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Topete Sanchez failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See
Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.