United States v. 2020-03-11 | 19-15142 | RUBEN VALDEZ V. JEFFREY BEARD | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RUBEN VALDEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, Secretary of
Corrections; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-15142

D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01839-AWI-JLT

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020
**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Ruben Valdez, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from his continued
placement in administrative segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

MAR 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2017) (qualified immunity); Patel v. City of Montclair, 798 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir.
2015) (dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6));
Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Valdez’s equal protection claim
because Valdez failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he received disparate
treatment compared to similarly situated inmates. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Equal Protection
Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally.”); see also
Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (“California’s policy of assigning suspected gang affiliates
to the Security Housing Unit is . . . designed to preserve order in the prison and
protect the safety of all inmates.” (internal citation omitted)).
With regard to the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) hearings
prior to April 2014, Valdez failed to show that he suffered any constitutional
violation related to these hearings. Furthermore, the district court did not err in
dismissing Valdez’s due process claims regarding the ICC hearings prior to April
2014 on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to
every reasonable official that a failure to provide post-placement periodic,
meaningful reviews violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional
right. See Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (defendants

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would not be held liable for failure to provide meaningful reviews of lengthy
confinement because this right was not clearly established); see also Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (outlining the two-part test for qualified
immunity).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Valdez’s due
process claims regarding ICC hearings after April 2014 because Valdez failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his due process rights were
violated during his continued placement in administrative segregation. See
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986) (inmates in
administrative segregation are entitled to due process protections consisting of
periodic review, notice of hearings, and an opportunity to be heard), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Valdez’s motion for
reconsideration because Valdez failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth standard for review and grounds for reconsideration).
AFFIRMED.