United States v. 2020-03-10 | 19-15626 | WINSTON WILLIAMS V. L. GAMBOA | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WINSTON WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

L. GAMBOA, M.D., Chief Surgeon; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

WILLIAM MUNIZ, Warden,

Defendant.

No. 19-15626

D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00098-JST

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020
**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Winston Williams, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

MAR 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-15626
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Williams
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his shoulder pain. See id. at 1057-60 (a prison official is
deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health; a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment,
medical malpractice, or negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition
does not amount to deliberate indifference); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098
(9th Cir. 2006) (delays must result in substantial harm to constitute deliberate
indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) to defer or deny summary judgment pending additional
discovery, because Williams failed to demonstrate how additional discovery would
have precluded summary judgment. See Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th
Cir. 1998) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking
additional discovery must show that the evidence sought would preclude summary
judgment).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion
for default judgment because defendants had not yet been served. See Eitel v.
McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review
and factors to consider in determining whether to enter default judgment).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendants’ request to remove defendant Muniz from the case caption, set
forth in the answering brief, is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.