United States v. 2020-02-12 | 18-55930 | NAGUI MANKARUSE V. RAYTHEON COMPANY | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NAGUI MANKARUSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RAYTHEON COMPANY; DOES, 1-100,
inclusive,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-55930

D.C. No. 8:15-cv-01273-JVS-DFM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 4, 2020
**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Nagui Mankaruse appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his diversity action alleging claims under California’s Fair Employment and
Housing Act (“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017). We

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

FEB 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-55930
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mankaruse’s
FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims because Mankaruse failed to establish
a prima facie case. See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1130 (Cal.
2005) (elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA); Guz v. Bechtel
Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000) (elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination under FEHA). Because Mankaruse did not establish a prima facie
case for discrimination, the district court properly granted summary judgment on
Mankaruse’s failure to prevent discrimination claim. See Featherstone v. S. Cal.
Permanente Med. Grp., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 258, 272 (Ct. App. 2017) (“Where . . . a
plaintiff cannot establish a claim for discrimination, the employer as a matter of
law cannot be held responsible for failing to prevent same[.]”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mankaruse’s
interactive process claim because Mankaruse failed to establish a time when the
interactive process should have occurred. See Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal.-Orange
Cty., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 365 (Ct. App. 2009) (elements of interactive
process claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a stay pending
resolution of Mankaruse’s state court proceedings involving similar allegations.
See Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979)

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(standard of review and explaining that a district court may stay an action pending
resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mankaruse’s
motion to continue the trial date and extend the discovery deadline, because
Mankaruse failed to demonstrate diligence or how additional discovery would have
precluded summary judgment. See Panatronic USA v. AT&T Corp., 287 F.3d 840,
846 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review and discussing requirements to reopen
discovery after motion for summary judgment is filed).
AFFIRMED.