United States v. 2020-02-06 | 18-72685 | HARWINDER SINGH V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HARWINDER DHILLON SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 18-72685

Agency No. A070-970-088

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 4, 2020
**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Harwinder Dhillon Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal.
Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of
law, including claims of due process violations. Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

FEB 6 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-72685
F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014). We dismiss the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that
Singh did not show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United
States citizen wife. See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012)
(absent a colorable legal or constitutional claim, the court lacks jurisdiction to
review the agency’s discretionary determination regarding hardship). Singh’s
contentions that there was no basis for the finding that the qualifying relative’s son
can provide for her financially and that the agency failed to fully consider a
psychological evaluation are not supported by the record, and therefore do not raise
colorable claims to invoke jurisdiction. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d
926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To be colorable in this context, . . . the claim must have
some possible validity.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In light of this dispositive determination, we do not reach Singh’s contention
regarding whether 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (engaging in terrorist activity) bars
him from cancellation of removal. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538
(9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.