Austin M. Braun v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUSTIN M. BRAUN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-35764
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00070-JCL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 23, 2019
Portland, Oregon
Before: FARRIS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A), Braun is required to show that he is
“disabled” to receive benefits. There is no dispute that he has (1) attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, (2) speech and language delays, (3) organic brain
FILED
NOV 08 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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syndrome, and (4) anxiety. In spite of this, the record supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that he has been able to work limited hours at numerous jobs. Although
he has not held a job for longer than a few months, he often earned positive
performance reviews and regularly chose to leave jobs of his own accord. The
ALJ also had substantial evidence to conclude that he can successfully do chores,
take medication, drive an automobile, attend social functions and complete other
such tasks independently.
The ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that Braun did not suffer from
“[m]arked restrictions in activities of daily living” or “[m]arked difficulties” in
maintaining social functioning or concentration, persistence or pace. See 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 12.02(B), 12.06(B) (2016).
Further, the ALJ properly accounted for Braun’s functional limitations when
concluding that Braun could find employment in the national economy in
numerous jobs, such as garbage collector, window cleaner, or addresser.
The ALJ properly rejected two additional limitations proposed by
Braun—that he would require significant job coaching and vocational
accommodations and that he would be off task approximately 20% of the time. An
ALJ may freely “reject any restrictions . . . that are not supported by substantial
evidence.” Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
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Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989)). The record contains
substantial evidence that Braun could remain on task and work effectively without
extensive job coaching in some of his past jobs. We affirm the ALJ’s
determination that he is not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act.
AFFIRMED.
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