Trina R. Patterson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRINA R. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-55134
D.C. No. 5:17-cv-01049-PSG-PLA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Trina R. Patterson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and
state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 29 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s FDCPA claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because Patterson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants’ conduct in enforcing a security interest was unfair or unconscionable.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (prohibiting unfair or unconscionable conduct in
enforcing a security interest); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964,
971 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing protections for borrowers set forth in § 1692f(6));
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Patterson’s state law claims after dismissing
Patterson’s FDCPA claims. See Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087,
1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (standard of review); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,
40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that when “federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to

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exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Patterson’s motion
to alter or amend judgment because Patterson failed to establish any basis for such
relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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