Miguel Sanchez-Antunez, aka Miguel Sanchez Antunez v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL SANCHEZ-ANTUNEZ, aka
Miguel Sanchez Antunez,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
Nos. 16-70274, 16-72681
Agency No. A200-154-662
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 5, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: COLE, Chief Judge,*** FISHER and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Sanchez Antunez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable R. Guy Cole, Jr., Chief Judge for the United States Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of
Sanchez Antunez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and denying his motions to continue and
remand. Sanchez Antunez also petitions for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion
to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the
petitions.
The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Ali v.
Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2011). A finding is not supported by
substantial evidence when “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary based on the evidence in the record.” Bringas-Rodriguez
v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014)). Purely legal questions
and “mixed questions of law and fact requiring us to exercise judgment about legal
principles” are reviewed de novo. Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1312
(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Motions to continue, remand, and reopen are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009); Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395
F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts
“arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to the law.” Movsisian, 395 F.3d at 1098
(quoting Lainez-Ortiz v. INS, 96 F.3d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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The BIA’s decision affirming the denial of a continuance was not an abuse of
discretion. First, Sanchez Antunez’s claim that his hearing should have been
continued pending the outcome of his application for Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (“DACA”) is moot, because his application was denied during the pendency
of this appeal.1 See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996). Second, Sanchez
Antunez did not establish good cause for a continuance to obtain a mental
competency evaluation because he did not exhibit any indicia of incompetency. See
Salgado v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding no abuse of
discretion when petitioner “did not show an inability to answer questions or a high
level of distraction”); Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011).
Finally, the IJ did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Sanchez Antunez
additional time to present documentation regarding his mental health because the
record already contained evidence of his diagnosis, and Sanchez Antunez had
already sought, and been granted, continuances. See Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1012 (citing
factors to consider); Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
motion to continue because petitioner “had already received a continuance of three
and a half weeks to get whatever he needed”).
1 Because the accuracy of the notice of denial of consideration of DACA cannot reasonably be
questioned, and Sanchez Antunez does not oppose the motion to take judicial notice, the
government’s motion for judicial notice of materials establishing mootness (ECF No. 21) is
GRANTED. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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The BIA did not err in denying Sanchez Antunez’s claims for asylum and
withholding of removal. Even if Sanchez Antunez had timely filed his asylum
application, the BIA did not err in holding he failed to establish a cognizable
particular social group. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228–29 (9th
Cir. 2016); Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013).
The BIA did not err in denying Sanchez Antunez’s request for relief under
CAT because he did not establish the requisite likelihood that he would be subject
to torture with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. See Villegas v.
Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
Sanchez Antunez did not establish a due process violation. He was able to
present his case and has not demonstrated that the outcome of his application would
have been affected by any alleged violation. See Rizo v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 693
(9th Cir. 2016).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez Antunez’s motion to
remand on the basis that the reports he sought to admit into the record would not
have changed the outcome of the proceedings. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 464, 471–73 (BIA 1992).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez Antunez’s motion to
reopen. Sanchez Antunez did not explain why the new evidence he sought to
introduce was previously unavailable, why he could not have discovered it sooner,

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or how it is qualitatively different than evidence he has already presented. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
PETITIONS DENIED.

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