Jennifer Lu v. Stanford University

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNIFER LU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-16150
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-07034-VC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 19, 2019**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Lu appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 18-16150
The district court properly dismissed Lu’s action because Lu failed to allege
facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se
pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The court need not . . . accept as true
allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit”
nor “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
unreasonable inferences.”); see also Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
prima facie cases of retaliation and discrimination under Title VII); Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 819 (Cal. 1993) (discussing elements
of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under California law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lu leave to file a
second amended complaint. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp., 232 F.3d 719, 725 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“A district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when
amendment would be futile . . . .”); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d
992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court’s discretion “particularly broad” when it
has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend).

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3 18-16150
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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