United States of America v. Oscar Jesus Ruiz-Hernandez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
OSCAR JESUS RUIZ-HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10355
D.C. No.
4:16-cr-00511-CKJ-LAB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 6, 2019**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Oscar Jesus Ruiz-Hernandez appeals his conviction for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841. Ruiz-Hernandez
alleges that his detention at an interior immigration checkpoint exceeded what is
constitutionally permitted under United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 8 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 17-10355
(1976), and that the evidence obtained as a result of the detention should have been
suppressed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the stop
and detention were within the scope of Martinez-Fuerte and the district court did
not clearly err in finding consent was voluntarily given, we affirm.
1. Brief questioning at an internal permanent checkpoint is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment if the questioning remains within “the scope of the stop.”
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566–67. The border control agent began the
inspection by asking Ruiz-Hernandez whether he was a United States citizen and
then requesting immigration documents. This immigration-related questioning is
precisely within the scope and purpose of the checkpoint.
A brief detention following valid immigration questioning is constitutional
as long as it is “predicated on an articulable suspicion or ‘a minimal showing of
suspicion.’” United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 1982)). Here, the agent
noticed that Ruiz-Hernandez “looked a little nervous, look[ed] straight ahead” with
“no eye contact,” “grabb[ed] the steering wheel,” and answered questions quickly
“[l]ike he was in a hurry.” These observations, accompanied by the brevity of the
interaction—“couldn’t have been more than a minute”—provided the minimal
showing required.
2. “[C]heckpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or

-- 2 of 3 --

3 17-10355
probable cause to search.” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567. The agent asked
Ruiz-Hernandez if he could look in the truck. Ruiz-Hernandez responded “yes”
and released the latch, opening the trunk. At no time did the agent make any
threatening movements toward his weapon. We consider the totality of the
circumstances, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), and the
district court did not clearly err in finding that Ruiz-Hernandez consented to the
search. See United States v. Preciado-Robles, 964 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding the defendant consented at an immigration checkpoint where the officer
asked permission to search, did not draw his gun, and did not threaten the
defendant).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --