Yuli Marisela Velarde-Flores; v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YULI MARISELA VELARDE-FLORES; et
al.,
Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting
Attorney General; et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
No. 18-15278
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-00031-DJH-BSB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 5, 2019**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition that seeks
to enjoin the removal of petitioners Yuli Velarde-Flores, Ibeth Corral, and Liliana
Reyes Diaz to Mexico. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 7 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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matter jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). We have jurisdiction over this appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
1. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The statute’s jurisdiction-stripping mandate expressly extends to § 2241 habeas
corpus petitions. Id.
2. Because this petition arises from the government’s decision to execute
valid orders of removal, it facially falls within the statutory jurisdictional bar. The
decision whether to remove aliens subject to valid removal orders who have applied
for U-visas is entirely within the Attorney General’s discretion. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.14(c)(1)(ii) (“The filing of a petition for U–1 nonimmigrant status has no
effect on ICE’s authority to execute a final order, although the alien may file a
request for a stay of removal . . . .”); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 n.9 (1999) (“Section 1252(g) was directed against a
particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial
discretion.”). The petitioners do not identify any cognizable liberty interest in
remaining in the country while their applications are pending. Cf. Jimenez v.
Nielsen, 334 F. Supp. 3d 370, 384–85 (D. Mass. 2018) (declining to apply § 1252(g)

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in case involving alien spouses of United States citizens seeking waivers of
inadmissibility under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7).
3. Although placement on a waitlist for a U-visa can entitle an applicant
to deferred action, 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), Reyes was not on the waitlist when the
district court dismissed this action. We express no opinion as to whether her
subsequent placement on the waitlist provides a basis for an application to the Board
of Immigration Appeals to reopen her removal order.
AFFIRMED.

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