United States of America v. Omar Quiroz-Leon

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
OMAR QUIROZ-LEON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-10183
D.C. No. 4:17-cr-01069-RCC-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Omar Quiroz-Leon appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 18-month sentence imposed on revocation of his probation. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Quiroz-Leon contends that the district court procedurally erred by rejecting
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 22 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the parties’ disposition agreement for a sentence at the high end of the Chapter 7
Guidelines range and by failing to explain adequately its reasoning for imposing
the 18-month sentence. We review these contentions for plain error. See United
States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).
The record demonstrates that the district court was aware of the 18 to 24
month sentencing range governing the original offense, as well as the 3 to 9 month
range contained in the Chapter 7 policy statement, and exercised its discretion to
impose a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range for the original offense.
See United States v. Plunkett, 94 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1996) (at probation
revocation, sentencing court has discretion to use the Guidelines range calculated
at the original sentencing or the revocation policy statement range). The record
also demonstrates that the district court made this decision based on an
individualized consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the
circumstances of Quiroz-Leon’s case, rather than a blanket policy regarding
probation violators. The court did not err by failing to provide a more detailed
explanation of its reasoning. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Quiroz-Leon next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The 18-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the

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applicable section 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances.
See id.
AFFIRMED.

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