Texte intégral
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANDREW SUTTON BLITZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50394
D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00112-PA-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Sutton Blitz appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 70-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for
conspiracy, possession of unauthorized devices, aggravated identity theft, and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1029, 1028A, and 2. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Blitz contends that the district court erred by imposing a two-level
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during
flight from law enforcement. Blitz concedes that the high-speed chase constituted
reckless endangerment, but argues that the district court clearly erred by finding he
was the driver of the vehicle involved in the chase. The district court’s finding that
Blitz was the driver was not clearly erroneous because it was supported by a law
enforcement officer’s identification of Blitz as the man he saw fleeing the scene of
the chase, the fact that Blitz had access to the vehicle, and Blitz’s co-conspirator’s
statement. See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (district court’s factual findings at sentencing are reviewed for clear
error); United States v. Spangle, 626 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court’s
factual findings are clearly erroneous only if they are “illogical, implausible, or
without support in the record”). Contrary to Blitz’s argument, the district court did
not err by relying on the police officer’s identification because other evidence
corroborated it. See United States v. Ingham, 486 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007)
(district court may rely on hearsay at sentencing as long as it is supported by “some
minimal indicia of reliability” (internal quotations omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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