Jessica Saepoff, in propia persona v. JAY RIEHLE, Revenue Officer, individually

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JESSICA SAEPOFF, in propia persona,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAY RIEHLE, Revenue Officer,
individually and in his capacity as employee
of the United States, Internal Revenue
Service; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-35589
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00482-JLR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Jessica Saepoff appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Dexter v. Colvin, 731 F.3d
977, 980 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Saepoff’s claims challenging her tax
liabilities as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (“the Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a),
because Saepoff sought to restrain the government’s tax assessment and collection
activities, and no exception to the Act applies. See Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521,
523 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court must dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction any suit that does not fall within one of the exceptions to the Act.”);
see also 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (listing statutory exceptions); Elias, 908 F.2d at 525
(discussing limited judicial exception).
The district court properly dismissed Saepoff’s claims challenging the
private defendants’ compliance with the Internal Revenue Service notices of levy
because the notices immunized those defendants from suit. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6332(a), (e).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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