United States of America v. Justin Dean Dixson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN DEAN DIXSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-30116
D.C. No. 4:15-cr-00148-BLW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Justin Dean Dixson appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 276-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction
for sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-30116
Dixson contends that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence because the court considered improper aggravating factors and deprived
him of the benefit of his plea agreement. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing Dixson’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007). The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and then
granted a four-level departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. In deciding to impose a
sentence 14 months above the resulting range, the court properly considered
several aggravating factors that it believed were not adequately reflected in the
Guidelines calculation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2); United States v. Christensen,
828 F.3d 763, 819 (9th Cir. 2015). Moreover, the district court did not deny
Dixson the benefit of his plea agreement. Dixson agreed that the district court
could consider all relevant conduct and had complete discretion to impose any
lawful sentence, including the statutory maximum of 360 months. The 276-month
sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the duration and extent of
the abuse. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.

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