United States of America v. Lagranger Jones

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LAGRANGER JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-10331
D.C. No.
2:15-cr-00061-GEB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** Senior
District Judge.
Defendant-Appellant LaGranger Jones appeals his 210-month sentence for
distribution of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. The applicable Guidelines range is 262 to 327
months. Jones, who is paraplegic, argues that (1) the district court erred in refusing
to apply U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, which allows for a downward departure based on
“extraordinary physical impairment,” and (2) his sentence is substantively
unreasonable.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), we review a district court’s decision whether to grant a downward
departure as part of the overall substantive reasonableness analysis. See United
States v. Kaplan, 839 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]o the extent that a district
court has framed its analysis in terms of a . . . departure, we will treat such so-
called departures as an exercise of post-Booker discretion to sentence a defendant
outside of the applicable guidelines range [, and that sentence] is subject to a
unitary review for reasonableness.” (alterations in original) (quoting United States
v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2006))). As a result, the question
whether the district court erred by not applying a departure under § 5H1.4 is
“replaced” by the question whether the district court “impose[d] a reasonable
sentence.” United States v. Vasquez-Cruz, 692 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Mohamed, 459 F.3d at 986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jones’s below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. See United
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that a sentence within the

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Guidelines range is usually reasonable); United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722,
729 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because ‘a Guidelines sentence will usually be reasonable,’
[the defendant’s] below-Guidelines sentence, supported by the district court's
specific reasoning, is reasonable.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Carty, 520 F.3d at 994)). It was not an abuse of discretion for the district
court to conclude that Jones’s disability—though undoubtedly challenging—did
not require an additional downward variance from the Guidelines range. Nor does
Jones identify another reason why his sentence is unreasonable. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM.

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