United States of America v. NNA ALPHA ONUOHA, AKA Naa Alpha Onuoha

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NNA ALPHA ONUOHA, AKA Naa
Alpha Onuoha,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-50399
D.C. No.
2:13-cr-00676-BRO-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and STEEH,*** District Judge.
FILED
MAR 31 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable George Caram Steeh III, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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Defendant-Appellant Nna Onuoha appeals the district court’s order granting
the Government’s request to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication
under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). This is Onuoha’s second appeal
of an order by the district court permitting involuntary medication. In the first
appeal, we vacated the district court’s order and remanded on an open record. See
United States v. Onuoha, 820 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). We held that the
first Sell factor—whether important governmental interests are at stake in
prosecuting the defendant for the charged offense—was satisfied, but that the
fourth Sell factor—whether the proposed treatment plan was in the patient’s best
medical interests in light of his medical condition—was not satisfied. See id. at
1054. On remand, the district court held a hearing and again granted the
Government’s Sell motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291, and we
affirm.
Onuoha challenges the district court’s second Sell order only as to the first
factor. Whether this factor is met is primarily a legal question, so we review it de
novo. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 693 (9th Cir. 2010). Onuoha
contends that while his offense was “serious” enough to support an important
governmental interest in prosecution, his offense’s Sentencing Guidelines range of
27 to 33 months makes it less serious than other “serious” offenses that can satisfy
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the first Sell factor. We recognized in our prior opinion that 27 to 33 months “is
lower than any range we have previously held to be indicative of a ‘serious’ crime
under the first Sell factor.” Onuoha, 820 F.3d at 1055. But we also made clear
that “the Guidelines range is only the starting point in determining whether the
government has an important interest in prosecution.” Id. We placed heavy
emphasis on the fact that Onuoha’s actions were reasonably perceived as threats of
terrorism, and that they necessitated a significant security response. See id. These
considerations outweighed the relatively low Guidelines range. See id. at 1055–56.
Onuoha has not persuaded us that we should consider these interests differently
now.
Onuoha next argues that the time he has spent in custody since his arrest
mitigates the Government’s interest in prosecution. It is true that Onuoha has been
in federal custody since September 11, 2013. At the time of our earlier decision,
Onuoha had served longer than the minimum Guidelines range of 27 months. Id.
at 1056. He has now served above the Guidelines maximum of 33 months. But
even if Onuoha’s additional time in custody tends to lessen the Government’s
interest in prosecution, see Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, nonetheless it does not nullify that
important interest. As explained in our earlier opinion, the Government’s interest
in obtaining a conviction extends not only to incapacitating Onuoha, but also to
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deterring others from making similar threats. Onuoha, 820 F.3d at 1056–57. This
interest in general deterrence holds firm regardless of the length of Onuoha’s
pretrial detention. We note that generally deterring others from making threats of
violence related to the nation’s transportation infrastructure remains an important
goal for society.
There is a separate reason beyond gaining conviction and deterring others
for concluding that important governmental interests are at stake. With a
conviction comes the possibility of supervised release, which may be critical to
preventing Onuoha from making similar threats in the future. See id. at 1056.
Prosecuting Onuoha thus benefits not only society but possibly Onuoha himself,
who without supervision may become embroiled in another such controversy.
Finally, Onuoha asserts that the Government’s interest in prosecution is
mitigated because his offense was a product of his mental illness. There is support
in the record for the notion that Onuoha’s threats were driven, at least in part, by
mental illness. And “the fact that a defendant’s mental disorder contributed to his
offense may weaken the government’s interest in prosecuting him.” United States
v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). However, in certain cases,
“the link between [a defendant’s] mental disorder and his charged crimes makes
his prosecution all the more important.” Id. That appears to be the case here,
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where absent prosecution and treatment, there is a risk Onuoha may repeat similar
threats in the future.
We conclude that the district court did not err in holding that the
Government met its burden on the first Sell factor.
AFFIRMED.
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