Linda E. Ewing v. RANDY MEGRDLE, Detective Employee Number 135509 an Officer of Lancaster Sheriff’s Dept

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINDA E. EWING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RANDY MEGRDLE, Detective Employee
Number 135509 an Officer of Lancaster
Sheriff’s Dept; C. HUSBANDS, Sergeant
Employee Number 135509 an Officer of
Lancaster Sheriff’s Dept,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-56061
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01334-MWF-
AJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Linda E. Ewing appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian
Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ewing’s Fourth
Amendment judicial deception claim because Ewing failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Megrdle procured the search
warrant by making misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with a reckless
disregard for the truth. See Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of
judicial deception).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for
leave to amend because granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to
defendants and cause undue delay. See Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385,
1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review and relevant factors;
noting that prejudice is the most important factor). We reject as without merit
Ewing’s contention that the district court improperly considered the motion
seeking leave to amend after granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for
reconsideration because Ewing did not present any newly discovered evidence.

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See Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Salesm U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211-12
(9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and noting that evidence is not
newly discovered if it could have been discovered earlier with reasonable
diligence); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7-18.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009);
see also Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not
manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a
claim[.]”).
AFFIRMED.

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