Texte intégral
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YOLANDA YVETTE COBB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-15316
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00888-BAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER***, TASHIMA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the
Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Yolanda Cobb appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of
her application for Social Security disability benefits. For the reasons stated below,
we affirm.
1. Social Security Ruling 13-2p, ¶ 7.b requires the agency to “have evidence
in the case record that establishes that a claimant with a co-occurring mental
disorder(s) would be disabled in the absence of [substance abuse].” Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that in the absence of substance abuse
Cobb would no longer qualify as disabled. Dr. Vydro evaluated Cobb when she
denied any substance abuse and had been staying at the hospital for a few days.
During this evaluation, Dr. Vydro found her cooperative and pleasant. He also noted
that she exhibited insight and judgment displaying intact cognitive functioning. Dr.
Gaab, on the other hand, evaluated Cobb after she had abused prescription drugs. In
his diagnosis, Dr. Gaab found Cobb’s cognitive functioning prevented her from
working. The ALJ’s comparison of these evaluations provided substantial evidence
in support of the determination that without substance abuse Cobb would no longer
be disabled. See, e.g., Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s
conclusion that must be upheld.”).
2. Phillips v. Commissioner of Social Security, 613 F. App’x 641, 642 (9th
Cir. 2015), does not suggest a different result. In comparing the medical evaluations
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of Drs. Vydro and Gabb, the ALJ considered whether Cobb would remain disabled
if she limited her use of medications to the prescribed dosage because during her
stay at the hospital—the backdrop of Dr. Vydro’s evaluation—Cobb’s medication
use was limited to the dosage properly prescribed.
AFFIRMED.
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