Joseph Kwaku Boateng v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH KWAKU BOATENG,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 11-72044
Agency No. A087-454-482
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 15, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: MELLOY,** CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Kwaku Boateng appeals the district court’s determination that he is
not a United States citizen, arguing that the Government failed to establish alienage
by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, violated his Fourth Amendment
rights and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 by wiretapping phone calls he placed from a detention
FILED
DEC 02 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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center, and violated his due process rights by failing to provide him his A-file
before the district court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and deny his petition for review.
The district court did not clearly err in determining that the Government met
its evidentiary burden of establishing alienage by “clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence.” Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420, 426 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that the Government’s burden to establish alienage by “clear,
unequivocal, and convincing” evidence signifies the same intermediate standard as
“clear and convincing” and that a district court’s citizenship determination under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) is reviewed for clear error). To demonstrate that Joseph
Boateng was born in Ghana, the Government offered: his father’s application for
lawful residence certifying Joseph was born in Accra, Ghana; his applications for a
Social Security card and a replacement Social Security card listing Accra, Ghana,
as his birthplace; his Texas identification card acquired through an application
listing Koforidua, Ghana, as the applicant’s birthplace; and a Form I-20 certificate
of eligibility for nonimmigrant status filled out by a Tuskegee University
admissions officer on behalf of Joseph Boateng, listing Ghana as the applicant’s
place of birth.
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In addition, as the district court concluded, there were also reasons to
question the veracity of the documents Boateng offered as evidence. The district
court identified anomalies in several documents, indicative of a lack of
authenticity. Moreover, transcripts of phone calls Boateng placed from the
detention center cast doubt upon the reliability of his evidence. The transcripts
revealed Boateng speaking with his brother and mother about the costs of
procuring an immunization card and the information that should be included on it
when his mother prepared it. The district court’s determination that the
Government bore its burden of establishing alienage, even if it had admitted the
documents Boateng offered as evidence, “is plausible in light of the record viewed
in its entirety.” Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 426 (quoting Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
Boateng failed to establish that the Government violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by wiretapping the phone calls he placed from the detention
center. The Fourth Amendment is only triggered if the Government “intrudes into
an area in which there is a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.’” United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986)). “[A] ‘constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy’ exists only if (1) the defendant has an ‘actual
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subjective expectation of privacy’ in the place searched and (2) society is
objectively prepared to recognize that expectation.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)). Even if Boateng could establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy in calls placed from the detention center, he
could not prove that the wiretap was unreasonable, as “institutional security
concerns justify such recordings and render them reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes.” Id. at 291.
Boateng did not demonstrate that the wiretap violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
Although 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b) forbids the intentional use of any “electronic,
mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication,” because “oral
communications may be intercepted by investigative and law enforcement officers
acting in the ordinary course of their duties,” and because implied consent may be
found when an individual used a phone where warnings of recording had been
issued, Boateng has not shown a violation of the statute. See Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at
291-92.
Boateng’s due process rights to a full and fair hearing were not violated by
the Government’s failure to provide his A-file during the district court
proceedings. To prevail on a due process claim, an individual must establish that
the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair,” that he “was prevented from
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reasonably presenting his case,” and that this caused prejudice, meaning “the
outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Dent
v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, regardless of whether the
Government should have produced the A-file during his removal proceedings, the
A-file has since been given to Boateng and he has not shown that the documents
could reasonably have affected the outcome of the proceeding, thereby failing to
establish prejudice. See id.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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