Terry Worley v. PITE DUNCAN, LLP; PNC BANK, N.A., DBA PNC Mortgage

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERRY WORLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PITE DUNCAN, LLP; PNC BANK, N.A.,
DBA PNC Mortgage,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-35241
D.C. No. 6:13-cv-02104-AA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 5, 2016**
Portland, Oregon
Before: TALLMAN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges and BATTAGLIA,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge for the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 9 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Terry Worley appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for failure
to state a claim against Pite Duncan, LLP (“Pite Duncan”) and PNC Bank, N.A.
(“PNC”). The complaint asserted claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and Oregon law. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Worley argues that there were four inaccuracies in a payoff letter
prepared by Pite Duncan in connection with a loan serviced by PNC: the stated
principal, the amount of interest, Pite Duncan’s attorneys’ fees, and a
“Recording/Reconveyance” fee. Only the attorneys’ fees claim was raised below;
the others are therefore waived. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d
1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We generally do not consider arguments raised for the
first time on appeal.”).
2. The district court correctly dismissed Worley’s attorneys’ fees claim.
Although the complaint claimed that Worley owed Pite Duncan no fees at all, the
loan documents provided for attorneys’ fees in the event of default, and Worley
concedes that she defaulted on the loan, and that the law firm performed work related
to her default. The district court therefore appropriately concluded that her
attorneys’ fees claim was implausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).

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3. The district court did not err by failing to sua sponte provide Worley an
opportunity to amend her complaint. “Where a party does not ask the district court
for leave to amend, ‘the request [on appeal] to remand with instructions to permit
amendment comes too late.’” Alaska v. United States, 201 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (9th
Cir. 2000) (brackets in original) (quoting Jackson v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 538 F.2d 829,
833 (9th Cir. 1976)). Moreover, Worley does not explain how she would remedy
the pleading’s defects, merely stating in her opening brief that an amended complaint
“would more clearly outline the facts of the case that are necessary to prove Pite
Duncan’s violations under the FDCPA.”
AFFIRMED.

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