Edgar Emilio Angarita- Solorzano v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDGAR EMILIO ANGARITA-
SOLORZANO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-71391
Agency No. A070-947-011
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 5, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS, TYMKOVICH**, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Edgar Angarita-Solorzano (also known as Soled), a native and citizen of
Columbia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of
her appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of her application for asylum,
FILED
APR 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich, Chief Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
deny the petition.1
The IJ did not abuse his discretion in determining that Angarita’s conviction
under California Vehicle Code § 2800.3(a) was for a particularly serious crime.
See Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 678-79 (9th Cir. 2010). The IJ was
entitled to rely on both Angarita’s credible testimony and the contents of the arrest
report, which are materially consistent. Id.; Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800
F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015). That Angarita’s offense did not involve the
intentional use of force does not preclude the agency from adjudicating it a
particularly serious crime. See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1106-07 (9th
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Nor was Angarita deprived of the full and fair hearing guaranteed to her by
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The IJ took sufficient care to elicit
relevant testimony from Angarita and to ensure that she understood the
proceedings as they unfolded. Contrary to Angarita’s argument on appeal, the
record in no way demonstrates that Angarita was confused, misled, or obstructed
by the manner in which the IJ conducted her hearing. See, e.g., Oshodi v. Holder,
1 We grant the outstanding motions to become amicus curiae. Dkt. Nos. 28,
31.
2

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729 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacsina Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708,
709-710 (9th Cir. 2009); Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2004). We
cannot say that Angarita was prevented from reasonably presenting her case.
Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006).
The record also does not compel a finding that Angarita will more likely
than not be tortured if returned to Columbia. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079,
1083 (9th Cir. 2011). Angarita bears the burden to prove the likelihood of future
torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a); Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1163-64 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc). The IJ reasoned that the passage of time and the intervening
death of Angarita’s revolutionary father militated against a finding that it was more
likely than not that Angarita would be tortured if returned to Columbia. We cannot
say the record compels a different conclusion. See Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d
1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014).
DENIED.
3

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