In re: GREGORY MELVIN HAYNES, GREGORY MELVIN HAYNES v. Standing Committee on Professional Conduct, for the United States District Court for…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: GREGORY MELVIN HAYNES,
GREGORY MELVIN HAYNES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, for the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of California,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 14-15484
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-04642-DLJ-
RMW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 14, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge and REINHARDT and CHRISTEN, Circuit
Judges.
FILED
APR 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

-- 1 of 4 --

Gregory Melvin Haynes appeals an order from a three-judge panel of the
district court affirming the district court’s order disbarring him from the practice of
law before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
First, the local rules in effect at the time of the disciplinary proceeding
authorized the district court to disbar Haynes. The rules authorized: a judge to
refer attorney misconduct complaints to the Standing Committee on Professional
Conduct, N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 11-6(a)(4) (2010); the Standing Committee to
investigate charges that “any member of the bar of [the] Court . . . has engaged in
unprofessional conduct in connection with an action in [the] district,” N.D. Cal.
Civil L.R. 11-7(c) (2010); the Standing Committee to “institute a disciplinary
proceeding by filing with the Clerk a sealed petition” if “a majority of the members
determine that public reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or other formal
discipline is warranted,” N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 11-7(c)(3) (2010) (emphasis added);
and the judge assigned the case to impose discipline after issuing an “order to show
2

-- 2 of 4 --

cause . . . why [the respondent attorney] should not be disciplined as prayed for in
the petition,” N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 11-7(c)(4) (2010).1
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by choosing to disbar
Haynes. See In re Corrinet, 645 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011). It is undisputed
that Haynes repeatedly directed profane and abusive language toward opposing
attorneys, filed a declaration regarding his behavior that was contradicted by his
own testimony, regularly missed deadlines, and, most significantly, caused client
matters to be dismissed in the district court due to discovery violations and on
appeal for failure to prosecute. Haynes fails to acknowledge his actions or accept
any measure of responsibility. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that “suspension from practice and time to reflect on his
professional failings would not serve to protect the public, the court, and other
attorneys who practice [in the Northern District] from the deleterious effects of Mr.
Haynes’ lack of professional responsibility,” and that disbarment was therefore
appropriate. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883) (noting disbarment
serves not as punishment but to protect the public and the courts).
1 The version of the local rules that came into effect midway through
the disciplinary proceeding authorized the same procedure and discipline. See
N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 11-6(e) (2012). The district court offered Haynes the choice
of local rule version, but Haynes declined to decide so the district court continued
to follow the version in effect when the proceedings began.
3

-- 3 of 4 --

Haynes argues that various judges before whom he appeared were biased
and that his disbarment proceedings were procedurally deficient. But Haynes
makes no persuasive showing of bias or that he was prejudiced by any asserted
procedural deficiency.
AFFIRMED.
4

-- 4 of 4 --