Michael Kentrel Brown v. WHITTEN, Correctional Officer;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL KENTREL BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WHITTEN, Correctional Officer; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 15-15684
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00848-JAM-
KJN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 13, 2016**
Before: FARRIS, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Michael Kentrel Brown appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process claims arising out of the confiscation of his personal property. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
FILED
APR 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brown’s due process claim against
defendant Whitten because Brown had an adequate postdeprivation remedy under
California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not
constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property
deprivations.”).
The district court properly dismissed Brown’s due process claims against the
remaining defendants because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
those defendants personally participated in the offense, or that Brown has a
constitutional right to have his grievances processed or decided in a particular
manner. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates
lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific grievance procedure.”); see
also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for
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supervisory liability).
AFFIRMED.
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