Carolyn Rygg, a single woman and CRAIG DILWORTH, a single man v. David Fhulbert;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN RYGG, a single woman and
CRAIG DILWORTH, a single man,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
DAVID F HULBERT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-35080
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00864-JLR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 6, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: WALLACE, KLEINFELD, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Carolyn Rygg and her son, Craig Dilworth, engaged in extensive
state court litigation with their next-door neighbors, Larry and Kaaren Reinertsen,
to resolve a property line dispute. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the
FILED
MAY 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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trial court’s rulings in favor of the Reinertsens. See Reinertsen v. Rygg, No.
64661-3-I, 161 Wash. App. 1037 (2011), petition for review denied, 268 P.3d 224
(Wash. 2011).
Dissatisfied with the result of the state court proceedings, appellants filed an
action in federal court. Their 200-page amended complaint asserted 50 claims
against 21 defendants. The district court dismissed all but two of the claims in a
detailed order, and entered judgment against appellants on the remaining two
claims following a jury trial. We affirm the judgment and these rulings in a
separate memorandum disposition filed simultaneously with this one.
After the district court issued its dismissal judgment, appellants filed a
second federal action. Their complaint in the second federal action was largely
duplicative of their amended complaint in the first federal action. It named many
of the same defendants, as well as lawyers who had represented those defendants in
the first federal action. The district court sua sponte issued an order staying the
case but permitting the defendants to file one joint motion to dismiss. The
defendants filed a motion. After full briefing by the parties, the district court
granted the motion and dismissed the action.1
1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recount only an
abbreviated version of them here.
2

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Rygg and Dilworth appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the action, as
well as its denial of their motion for recusal of Judge Robart. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion
for recusal. The statements Judge Robart made in his orders denying certain post-
trial motions in the first federal action reflect opinions he formed based on his
extensive experience with this litigation; they do not demonstrate bias stemming
from an extrajudicial source, nor do they demonstrate that Judge Robart was
incapable of fair judgment. See Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043–44 (9th
Cir. 2008).
2. The district court properly dismissed appellants’ complaint.2 Counts 1–3
and 14–18 were duplicative of claims alleged in the first federal action; the district
court properly dismissed these counts for the same reasons it dismissed their
counterparts in the first federal action. The district court properly dismissed Count
13 for failure to state a claim: appellants do not have a right to be represented by an
attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law. The remaining claims
were state law claims, and the district court was well within its discretion to
2 Prior to entering its order on the motion to dismiss, the district court
granted appellants’ motion to withdraw Counts 5 and 6 from the complaint.
3

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decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See Bryant v. Adventist
Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002).
3. As in the first federal action, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying leave to amend the complaint. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.
4

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