Clarence Leon Dews v. County of Kern; City of Wasco

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLARENCE LEON DEWS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF KERN; CITY OF WASCO,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-16423
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00245-AWI-
MJS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2015**
Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Clarence Leon Dews appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
constitutional claims arising out of a prison fight. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th
FILED
MAR 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dews’s equal protection claim because
Dews failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was a member of a protected
class or that he was intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated
individuals for an irrational reason. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030
(9th Cir. 2013) (to allege a § 1983 equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must show
that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff
based upon membership in a protected class” (quotation omitted)); see also Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (a “class of one” plaintiff “must
allege that . . . [he] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”).
The district court properly dismissed Dews’s claims against the County of
Kern, City of Bakersfield, and City of Wasco because he failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that defendants’ policies caused his claimed injuries. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (explaining liability of
municipalities under § 1983).
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The district court properly denied Dews’s motions for summary judgment as
premature. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(a)-(b) (explaining that a court must first
screen a prisoner’s complaint to determine whether it has cognizable claims against
the named defendants).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dews’s discovery
motions as premature. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 768 n.10 (9th Cir.
2008) (setting forth standard of review).
We reject Dews’s contentions that the district court was prejudiced against
him or denied him equal protection and due process.
Dews’s motions to augment the record and for copies of transcripts, and
request for a writ of coram nobis, filed on September 8, 2014, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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