David Singui v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID SINGUI,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 10-71872
Agency No. A072-538-658
MEMORANDUM*
DAVID SINGUI, AKA Mpoupe Singui,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 11-70160
Agency No. A072-538-658
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted March 2, 2015
Pasadena, California
FILED
MAR 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Before: PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner David Singui petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his untimely-filed motions to reopen proceedings. We
grant the petitions and remand with instructions to reopen Singui’s deportation
proceedings.
1. Singui first argues that the BIA used the wrong standard in denying his
motions because it required him to show changed country conditions rather than
changed circumstances arising in the country. However, the BIA used both terms
interchangeably, as we have in our case law. See, e.g., Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538
F.3d 988, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2008); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945-47 (9th Cir.
2004). Therefore, the BIA did not apply the wrong standard to evaluate Singui’s
motions.
2. Next, Singui argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he failed to
show changed circumstances in Cameroon, which is an exception that permits
untimely-filed motions to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). Singui submitted
new evidence that was not available at the time of the proceedings before the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The evidence included emails from another anti-
government activist who said that he was detained in 2008 and that the authorities
specifically asked him about Singui, several articles showing that the government
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continues to mistreat activists like Singui, and a 2010 news article stating that
Singui’s name appears on a government “black list” of individuals known for anti-
government political activism. We conclude that the BIA erred in rejecting
Singui’s evidence. First, in denying relief, the IJ previously found that Singui was
not credible, based in part on the lack of corroborating documentary evidence.
Singui’s new documents—the previously unavailable emails and
articles—therefore undermine part of the IJ’s rationale in making the adverse
credibility finding. See Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2005)
(ruling that the BIA abused its discretion by denying a motion to reopen where
new evidence “completely undermined” the IJ’s rationale for denying the
petitioner’s asylum application). Second, while the evidence Singui presented to
the IJ was principally a showing of past mistreatment in Cameroon, Singui’s new
materials suggest Cameroon has in recent years both targeted him specifically and
persecuted a man who participated in the same political activism as Singui. His
new evidence therefore appears “qualitatively different” from the evidence
previously presented to the IJ. See Malty, 381 F.3d at 945-47 (ruling that the BIA
should have reopened where new evidence showed persecutors in Egypt were
specifically targeting the petitioner and attacking similarly-situated family
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members, in contrast to previous evidence limited to incidents of harassment and
discrimination).
Third, the BIA improperly faulted Singui for failing to submit an affidavit in
support of his motions to reopen, but the relevant regulation permits the
submission of evidentiary material without an accompanying sworn statement. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Indradjaja v. Holder, 737 F.3d 212, 219 (2d. Cir. 2013)
(stating that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) “does not mandate that any affidavit be
submitted, let alone require one specifically from the petitioner.”). Finally, the
BIA’s conclusion that Singui’s evidence merely shows a continuation of the same
conditions in Cameroon fails to recognize sufficiently that facts supporting
changed circumstances will almost always relate to the original claim. Thus, “[t]he
critical question is not whether the allegations bear some connection to a prior
application, but rather whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a
petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a
well-founded fear of future persecution.” Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.
PETITIONS GRANTED with instructions to reopen.
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Singui v. Holder, Nos. 10-71872, 11-70160
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In my opinion the BIA properly decided that Singui had not submitted
sufficient supporting evidence to justify reopening in light of changed country
conditions. In fact, he filed no affidavits swearing to the truth of his statements or
authenticating or otherwise justifying his claims. That is a particular problem
where, as here, he had been found to lack credibility in the original proceeding for
a multitude of reasons. As the IJ stated, Singui’s “application for asylum was
replete with inconsistencies and discrepancies.”1 The majority’s denigration of the
BIA’s reliance on the lack of affidavits overlooks the Supreme Court’s statements
regarding the alien’s heavy burden2 and the importance of affidavits,3 which have
particular bite here in light of the prior adverse credibility determination.4 In fine,
Singui’s presentation was so weak that the BIA could properly determine that it did
not rise to the level of a prima facie case; the BIA did not abuse its discretion.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.
FILED
MAR 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
1One of the grounds (the statement about the arrest of four individuals) was
both inconsistent and uncorroborated.
2INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108–11, 108 S. Ct. 904, 913–15, 99 L. Ed. 2d
90 (1988); see also Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir.
2008).
3See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1030, 67 L.
Ed. 2d 123 (1981) (per curiam).
4See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 2008).

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