Jeffrey G. Sharp v. Christian Stringer;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEFFREY G. SHARP,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CHRISTIAN STRINGER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-35465
D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00140-AA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 21, 2015**
Before: CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey G. Sharp appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and interference
with familial association. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
FILED
FEB 2 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (motion
to dismiss); Crowley v. Nev. ex rel. Nev. Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 733-34 (9th
Cir. 2012) (summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sharp’s false
arrest and malicious prosecution claims against defendants Houck, Brenner, and
Stringer because Sharp failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Houck and Brenner, the arresting officers, or Stringer, the prosecutor who
advised them, had a reasonable basis to believe that Sharp violated Oregon Revised
Statutes § 163.200. See Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937-39 (9th Cir. 2011)
(probable cause constitutes a defense to false arrest and malicious prosecution
under federal law); Gustafson v. Payless Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 525 P.2d 118,
119-20 (Or. 1974) (probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution
under Oregon law); Bacon v. City of Tigard, 724 P.2d 885, 886 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (same for false arrest). We reject Sharp’s contention that a prior judicial
determination as to his mother’s competence was required to support a finding of
probable cause.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sharp’s claim for
interference with familial association because Sharp failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant caused unwarranted
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interference with Sharp’s association with his mother. See Crowe v. County of San
Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 n.23 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for a claim of deprivation
of familial companionship is “unwarranted interference”).
The district court properly dismissed Sharp’s claim for damages against
defendant Kemper because all of Kemper’s alleged actions were taken in the
performance of prosecutorial functions. See Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d
914, 918 (9th Cir. 2013) (prosecutor has absolute immunity for decision to initiate
a prosecution); Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643
(9th Cir. 1999) (same for conduct before grand juries). Although Sharp’s amended
complaint also sought declaratory relief in addition to damages, because the relief
Sharp requested would not clarify any legal relations in issue or resolve any
controversy between the parties, we uphold the dismissal of Sharp’s claim against
Kemper in its entirety. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (declaratory relief should be denied when the relief requested
“will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in
issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and
controversy faced by the parties.”).
AFFIRMED.
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