United States of America v. Ronald John Salado

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD JOHN SALADO,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-10117
D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00343-LJO-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 12, 2015
San Francisco California
Before: NOONAN and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, Senior District
Judge.**
Ronald Salado appeals his jury convictions for money laundering and his
sentence for conspiracy to commit mail fraud and bank fraud, two counts of mail
fraud, nine counts of bank fraud, and two counts of money laundering, resulting
FILED
JAN 21 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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from a conspiracy to defraud almond growers and processors. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Salado moved for acquittal “on all the allegations.” However, the only bases
for his motion were the credibility of two witnesses and the sufficiency of the
evidence proving his theft of almonds. Salado did not raise the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his money laundering convictions. Plain error review of this
claim is therefore appropriate. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2010).
However, regardless of the standard of review, there simply was no error
here. A rational jury could have found all of the elements of money laundering
beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Chhun, 744 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 131 (2014). First, there was sufficient direct and
circumstantial evidence that Salado violated 18 U.S.C. § 1957. See United States
v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 1992). Second, by testifying,
Salado exposed himself to the “risk that if disbelieved, the trier of fact may
conclude that the opposite of his testimony is the truth,” and thus that he paid for
the car with criminal proceeds. United States v. Cordova-Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037,
1041-42 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1346 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
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We review for plain error Salado’s claim that the district court incorrectly
applied the Sentencing Guidelines because Salado did not object to the alleged
error at sentencing. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc). Again, there was no error of any kind here. The district court
properly applied a base offense level of seven per § 2B1.1(a)(1). The Sentencing
Guidelines’ index references § 2S1.1(a)(1) for crimes committed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957. In turn, the former cross-references § 2B1.1, stating the base offense level
is “[t]he offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered funds
were derived.” § 2S1.1(a)(1). The base offense level under § 2B1.1(a)(1) is seven,
“if (A) the defendant was convicted of an offense referenced to this guideline; and
(B) that offense of conviction has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of
20 years or more.” Salado was convicted of the underlying offenses of mail fraud
and bank fraud, each punishable by a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of
twenty years or more. Thus, the district court did not err.
Further, the district court’s loss calculation of $1 to $2.5 million was a
“reasonable” estimate based on Salado’s convictions for conspiracy and fraud, and
was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1001-04
(9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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