Moses Lloyd Champagne v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MOSES LLOYD CHAMPAGNE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-35681
D.C. No. 4:11-cv-00060-SEH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 27, 2014**
Before: D. NELSON, LEAVY, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Moses Lloyd Champagne appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
FILED
JUL 03 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Champagne contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in rejecting
his treating physicians’ objective findings and opinions, and in finding his
subjective complaints not fully credible. He also contends that the ALJ erred in
failing to find that a vocational expert’s testimony established that Champagne’s
limitations precluded him from performing substantial gainful activity. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s order de novo. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We may set aside the denial of benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Id.
The ALJ reasonably weighed the medical evidence of Champagne’s physical
limitations and found him capable of a reduced range of sedentary work despite his
back and ankle impairments. The ALJ reviewed the medical evidence in the
record, including the treatment notes of Champagne’s providers and the medical
source opinions of Dr. Roland Morrell, the consultative examiner, and Dr. John
Cey, the state agency physician. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. Champagne’s
contention that the ALJ disregarded his treaters’ opinions about his limitations
lacks merit, because none of the treating providers gave an opinion regarding his
functional limitations. Moreover, Champagne identified no additional medically
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necessary limitation that should have been included in the residual functional
capacity. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
The ALJ also reasonably discounted Champagne’s subjective complaints
regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms. The ALJ
offered valid, specific, and clear and convincing reasons to find that Champagne’s
subjective complaints of disabling limitations and inability to work were not
confirmed by the objective reports of his medical providers, that Champagne’s
description of activities exceeded his claimed limitations, and that Champagne’s
daily activities were inconsistent with his allegations. See Tommasetti v. Astrue,
533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ reasonably assessed the testimony of vocational expert Karen
Black. Based on the ALJ’s hypothetical, which incorporated medical assumptions
and Champagne’s limitations supported by the record, Black identified several jobs
in the national economy. Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685,
690 (9th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that
the Commissioner carried his burden to prove that Champagne can engage in work
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v); Lockwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071
(9th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED.
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