NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SIN MUI TJHIN,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 10-72337
Agency No. A097-369-290
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted May 13, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and DAWSON, District
Judge.**
Sin Tjhin, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an Immigration
FILED
JUN 05 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Kent J. Dawson, Senior United States District Judge
for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
-- 1 of 4 --
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal
and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the harm
suffered by Tjhin did not rise to the level of persecution. See Halim v. Holder, 590
F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the IJ’s conclusion that petitioner being
beaten by a mob, stripped naked and spat upon during school, denied medical
treatment and arrested and detained for a couple of days after police claimed they
found drugs in the car he was riding in failed to rise to level of persecution);
Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the BIA’s
determination that petitioner’s beating, robbery and confrontation with a
threatening mob failed to rise to level of persecution); Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d
1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding the BIA’s finding that petitioner being
beaten one time, harassed and threatened failed to rise to level of persecution).
In the absence of past persecution, an applicant may still be eligible for
asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b); Halim, 590 F.3d at 976. Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Tjhin failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution or an individualized risk of persecution under a disfavored group
2
-- 2 of 4 --
analysis. See Halim, 590 F.3d at 977-79; Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1180-
81 nn.4-5 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). This conclusion was properly buttressed by the
finding that Tjhin’s family members continued to reside in Indonesia without
harm, and the closure of her brother’s motorcycle business does not compel a
contrary conclusion. See Santos–Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir.
2008) (“We have considered the continuing safety of family members to be an
important factor in determining whether the petitioner has a well-founded fear of
future persecution”), overruled on other grounds by Henriquez–Rivas v. Holder,
707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Because Tjhin “could not establish her eligibility for asylum,” substantial
evidence supports the denial of Tjhin’s application for withholding of removal,
“which imposes a heavier burden of proof.” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182,
1190 (9th Cir 2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). Substantial evidence also
supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, as Tjhin failed to establish it was more
likely than not that she would be subject to torture if removed to Indonesia. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001).
The BIA did not deprive Tjhin of the full and fair hearing guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause. The BIA’s failure to mention certain details, such as the fact
that Tjhin resided in her sister’s home when it was burned, does not rebut the
3
-- 3 of 4 --
presumption that the BIA reviewed the record. See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439
F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006); Larita–Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2000).
PETITION DENIED.
4
-- 4 of 4 --