DELSON GROUP, INC, a Delaware corporation v. Gsm Association, a British nonprofit organization

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DELSON GROUP, INC, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GSM ASSOCIATION, a British nonprofit
organization and GSMA LTD, a Georgia
nonprofit corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-16809
D.C. No. 3:12-cv-02358-JSW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 17, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: ALARCÓN, TALLMAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Delson Group, Inc. appeals from the district court’s order dismissing
Delson’s trademark action against GSM Association. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
FILED
APR 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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The district court did not err in dismissing GSM’s complaint as a collateral
attack against a judgment rendered by a Georgia district court. Although a district
court may entertain such an attack, they are “disfavored.” F.D.I.C. v. Aaronian, 93
F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, “[c]ourts of appeals review with
deference a [nonrendering] court’s decision to defer to the rendering court.” Id. In
a similar context, we have instructed that “considerations of comity and orderly
administration of justice demand that the nonrendering court should decline
jurisdiction of such an action and remand the parties for their relief to the rendering
court.” Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169, 172 (9th Cir. 1964). The district
court therefore did not abuse its discretion by following these instructions.
Relying on Supreme Court dicta, Delson urges that a district court has no
discretion to dismiss a collateral attack premised on the rendering court’s alleged
lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has never squarely held as much,
and our own precedent weighs against such a conclusion. See Treadaway v.
Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences, 783 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“When a court entertains an independent action for relief from the final order of
another court, it interferes with and usurps the power of the rendering court just as
much as it would if it were reviewing that court's equitable decree. Although
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justice may occasionally demand that sort of interference, the identification of
those rare situations is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”)
Nor did the district court err in construing Delson’s complaint as an action
seeking relief from the judgment of another court. The Georgia district court
enjoined Delson from using the terms “Mobile World Congress” and “World
Mobile Congress” to promote its events, while Delson’s California action alleged
that GSM had violated Delson’s trademark as to the same terms. Because a
“request for a declaration that a prior order of the [Georgia district court] is null
and void” is “at the heart of [Delson’s] complaint,” the district court did not abuse
its discretion in construing Delson’s complaint as an independent action seeking
relief from the judgment of another court. Treadaway, 783 F.2d at 1421; see also
Aaronian, 93 F.3d at 639 (“The label affixed to the motion will not dictate the
outcome of the [nonrendering] court’s decision.”).
AFFIRMED.
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