Jason Ray Tyler v. CHARLES L. RYAN and TERRY L. GODDARD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON RAY TYLER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CHARLES L. RYAN and TERRY L.
GODDARD,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 12-15966
D.C. Nos. 4:10-cv-00353-RCC
4:10-cv-00543-RCC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Jason Ray Tyler appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for
habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and we affirm.
Even assuming the state breached the first plea agreement by entering a
subsequent indictment against Tyler, the state appellate court’s rejection of Tyler’s
FILED
NOV 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

-- 1 of 3 --

claim that the breach violated his due process rights was not an unreasonable
application of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). The state
appellate court could make “a principled distinction,” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d
983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), between Tyler’s case and Santobello because
Tyler withdrew his motion to dismiss the second indictment and subsequently
accepted a guilty plea conditioned on having his sentences for both convictions run
concurrently.
Nor did the state appellate court unreasonably apply Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974), or Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975), which
establish narrow exceptions to the general rule that a defendant cannot challenge
pre-plea constitutional errors once a plea has been entered. See United States v.
Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Rather, the court assumed that Tyler was entitled
to this exception, considered his claim that the second indictment violated his
rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and rejected the claim because the first
conviction was for a crime that had an element not included in the second
conviction, and vice versa.
Finally, Tyler has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court
precedent holding that a defendant’s right to due process is violated when a state
2

-- 2 of 3 --

court accepts a guilty plea from a defendant who has raised and abandoned a claim
that the prosecution at issue breaches a prior plea agreement. Accordingly, to the
extent this argument was raised to the state appellate court, its rejection of the
claim was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
AFFIRMED.
3

-- 3 of 3 --