Kledy Elizabeth Cano- Villatoro v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KLEDY ELIZABETH CANO-
VILLATORO,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 09-71691
Agency No. A076-854-094
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 9, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, M. SMITH, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Kledy Elizabeth Cano-Villatoro appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’s
(“BIA”) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
FILED
OCT 17 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The BIA’s determination that Cano-Villatoro had not been persecuted for
her family’s membership in the Civil Patrol was supported by substantial evidence
because Cano-Villatoro failed to demonstrate that the guerillas were aware of this
membership and therefore the guerillas could not have persecuted her on that basis.
See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Nor did Cano-Villatoro
establish that she was persecuted on account of her work experience as a nurse’s
assistant, because such work experience does not constitute an “immutable
characteristic” under the BIA’s decision in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,
232–33 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), and thus persons with such work
experience do not constitute a particular social group. Moreover, the record
contains no evidence that the guerrillas sought to persecute Cano-Villatoro because
she worked as a nurse’s assistant. Rather, as the BIA noted, the record reflects that
the guerillas were recruiting Cano-Villatoro’s help.
The agency’s conclusion that Cano-Villatoro could not establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution from the guerillas due to significant changes in
Guatemala also was supported by substantial evidence in the record, including
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evidence that the guerillas and Guatemalan government had entered into peace
accords in 1996, and the 2003 Country Report’s indication that the guerillas were
not responsible for continuing human rights violations. Cf. Molina-Estrada v. INS,
293 F.3d 1089, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2002). For the same reasons, the BIA’s denial of
Cano-Villatoro’s application for withholding of removal was supported by
substantial evidence. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Cano-Villatoro is not
“more likely than not” to suffer torture if returned to Guatemala. 8 C.F.R. §
1208.17(a).
Finally, we reject Cano-Villatoro’s argument that the BIA erred in applying
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i) to her retroactively. The regulation applied prospectively,
because she was on notice that the grant of voluntary departure would terminate if
she filed a petition for review. See Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504,
525–27 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Whenever the Attorney General decides not to
permit voluntary departure, and thereby terminates a grant, it is a determination of
the alien’s eligibility for voluntary departure at that moment in time.”).
PETITION DENIED.
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