John Mattox v. LEA ANN CHRONES, NKSP Warden;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN MATTOX,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LEA ANN CHRONES, NKSP Warden; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17788
D.C. No. 1:08-cv-01265-FRZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Frank R. Zapata, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2013**
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner John Mattox appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference
and excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
FILED
JUN 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on
any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th
Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mattox’s
deliberate indifference claim against Correctional Officer Montez because Mattox
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Montez’s conduct in
connection with the confiscation of Mattox’s handkerchief amounted to deliberate
indifference. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (to establish
deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to
respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the
indifference”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mattox’s
excessive force claim against Montez because Mattox failed to raise a triable
dispute as to whether Montez used force maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm. See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining that core judicial inquiry in an excessive force action is whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, and identifying
factors for resolving such inquiry).
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The district court did not err in declining to address Mattox’s motion to
permit discovery before granting summary judgment. See Margolis v. Ryan, 140
F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (providing the standard of review, and explaining
that in making a motion for further discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the movant
must identify what information is sought and how it would preclude summary
judgment). Nor did it abuse its discretion by denying Mattox’s motion regarding
his deposition transcript. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)
(setting forth the standard of review, and stating that a decision to deny discovery
will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of actual and substantial prejudice).
Dismissal of Mattox’s claims against defendant May was proper because
Mattox failed to allege sufficient facts in his First Amended Complaint to show a
causal connection between May’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violations.
See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the causation
element of § 1983 claim in connection with a defendant supervisor); Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (standard of review for a dismissal for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).
AFFIRMED.
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