United States of America v. Adrienne Lee Shipp

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADRIENNE LEE SHIPP,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-10181
D.C. No. 3:11-cr-08119-FJM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2013**
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Adrienne Lee Shipp appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 108-month sentence imposed following her jury-trial conviction for
involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a) and 1153; and
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6) and
FILED
JUN 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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12-10181 2
1153. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Shipp contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing (1)
adequately to address her arguments regarding sentencing disparities; (2) to
explain the basis for its disagreement with the manner in which the Guidelines
account for multiple victims or why consecutive sentences were necessary; and (3)
to tie her sentence to a correctly calculated Guidelines range or sufficiently explain
the degree of the upward variance. We find no error. The court entertained
Shipp’s arguments regarding sentencing disparities and distinguished Shipp’s case
from the cases Shipp cited at sentencing. Moreover, the court explained why it
believed that the Guidelines did not adequately account for multiple victims and
why consecutive sentences were necessary. Finally, the court correctly calculated
the advisory Guidelines range for each count and sufficiently explained its decision
to vary upward.
Shipp also contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Shipp’s sentence. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In light of the totality of the circumstances
and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the need to provide
punishment, protect the public, and reflect the seriousness of the offense, the
above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. See id.
AFFIRMED.

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