United States of America v. Hugh Clarence Ridgley

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HUGH CLARENCE RIDGLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-30145
DC No. 4:11 cr-0075 SEH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 7, 2013**
Portland, Oregon
Before: TASHIMA, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Hugh Ridgley was charged, under the Hobbs Act, with the robberies of two
pizza deliverymen. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). He appeals his conviction on both
FILED
MAR 15 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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counts, arguing that: (1) the interstate commerce jury instruction was defective;
and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. We affirm.
1. Ridgley takes issue with the following jury instruction: “To establish
that commerce was affected, the proof may only show a de minimus, that is, a
slight effect or a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce.” We have
repeatedly approved the standard described by this instruction. See, e.g., United
States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a jury instruction
challenge because “the Government need only prove that [defendant’s] actions had
a probable or potential effect on interstate commerce to support his conviction
under the Hobbs Act”). Moreover, this standard has been approved in prosecutions
for both substantive and inchoate offenses. See United States v. Boyd, 480 F.3d
1178, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (upholding a Hobbs Act conviction
because the completed robbery of a business “potentially impacted interstate
commerce”). Accordingly, there was no instructional error.
2. There was also sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions for both
counts. “In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational jury
could have found Defendant[] guilty of each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006).

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We reject Ridgley’s contention that the heightened test for robbery of1
individuals should apply. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 909 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam). This was not a case where the victims happened
to be employees of an interstate business; instead, they were acting within the
scope of their employment at the time of the respective crimes, and the stolen cash
belonged to their respective employers.
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“Robbery of an interstate business . . . typically constitutes sufficient evidence to
satisfy the Hobbs Act’s interstate commerce element.” United States v. Rodriguez,
360 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2004).1
The evidence showed that the two pizza restaurants were engaged in
interstate commerce because their supplies and ingredients came from out of state.
The evidence also showed that the stolen money belonged to the restaurants, not to
the individual victims. Accordingly, a rational jury could have found Ridgley
guilty on both robbery counts.
AFFIRMED.

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