Theodore C. Shove v. M. MARTEL, Warden;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THEODORE C. SHOVE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
M. MARTEL, Warden; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-16148
D.C. No. 5:11-cv-03707-RMW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 11, 2013**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Theodore C. Shove appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action under Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
FILED
FEB 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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12-16148 2
novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
(9th Cir. 2000), and whether Younger abstention is applicable, Gilbertson v.
Albright, 384 F.3d 965, 982 n.19 (9th Cir. 2004)(en banc). We affirm.
The district court properly determined that abstention under Younger was
appropriate because Shove’s state habeas corpus proceeding, still pending before
the California Supreme Court, raises similar issues as presented in his federal
complaint, implicates important state interests, and provides an adequate
opportunity to litigate his federal claims. See San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of
Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2008) (discussing Younger factors).
The district court judge’s recusal was not required because Shove has not
demonstrated that the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned or that
the judge had a plausible personal bias or prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”); United States v. Johnson,
610 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) (the fact that a district judge presided over the
litigant’s prior civil case was not a basis for recusal in a later proceeding).
AFFIRMED.

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