This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument, and therefore, denies defendants’ request for oral argument.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
INGRID PETERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM S. MORRIS, IV, President
Morris Communications, Publisher Homer
News; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35961
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00075-JWS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Ingrid Peterson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her diversity action alleging libel based on a local Alaska newspaper article about
FILED
JAN 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS
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11-35961 2
criminal charges being filed against her sons. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004), and
the denial of a motion for remand, D-Beam Ltd., P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates,
Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 974 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Peterson’s action against defendant
William S. Morris IV because Peterson failed to establish that Morris had certain
minimum contacts with the State of Alaska such that the maintenance of her suit
there would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1981)
(setting forth test for general or specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant under Alaska’s long-arm statute) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
The district court properly denied Peterson’s motion for remand because the
court was not divested of jurisdiction by Peterson’s attempts after removal to
reduce her request for damages below the minimum jurisdictional level and add as
defendants non-existent Alaska entities to destroy complete diversity. See Hill v.
Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1999) (diversity
jurisdiction existing at the commencement of an action is not divested by a later
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11-35961 3
reduction of the amount in controversy or a change in the parties’ citizenship).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Peterson further
leave to amend because Peterson only sought to add time-barred claims against
non-existent corporate entities. See Okwu v. McKim, 682 F.3d 841, 844, 846 (9th
Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of review and finding no abuse of discretion from
the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for another opportunity to amend
where plaintiff failed to identify any “amendment consistent with the facts she has
already alleged that would give her a viable claim”).
We do not address matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, including the district court’s award of costs and its denial of
Peterson’s discovery and recusal motions. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983,
985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Peterson’s arguments regarding the district court’s alleged bias are
unpersuasive and not supported by the record.
Defendant Morris’s request for costs and fees, set forth in the answering
brief, is denied without prejudice because such requests must be made by separate
motion. See 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6.
AFFIRMED.
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