Darin Gaston v. CARLEEN ST CLAIR, Prosecutor, Snohomish County Superior Courts

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARIN GASTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CARLEEN ST CLAIR, Prosecutor,
Snohomish County Superior Courts,
Defendant,
and
SNOHOMISH COUNTY,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35896
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00672-RSL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JAN 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Darin Gaston, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Snohomish
County violated his constitutional rights when two prior convictions were included
in the calculation of his offender’s score for purposes of sentencing. We review de
novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim, Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order),
and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Gaston’s action because Gaston failed
to allege that any constitutional deprivation occurred as a result of a custom or
policy of Snohomish County. See Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty, Dep’t of Pub.
Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (to establish municipal
liability under § 1983, plaintiff “must show that (1) [he] was deprived of a
constitutional right; (2) the County had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a
deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the
‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gaston’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Gaston failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

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forth standard of review and the requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel in civil cases).
AFFIRMED.

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