Everardo Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc.; and Schneider Logistics Transloading and Distribution, Inc.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Circuit Judge for the Tenth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
* NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Everardo Carrillo; Fernando Chavez;
Eric Flores; Jose Martinez; Arceo
Baltazar Zavala; and Juan Chavez,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
Schneider Logistics, Inc.; and
Schneider Logistics Transloading and
Distribution, Inc.,
Defendants - Appellants.
and
Premier Warehousing Ventures, LLC;
Rogers-Premier Unloading Services,
LLC; and Impact Logistics, Inc.
Defendants.
Nos. 12-55042, 12-55386
D.C. 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
FILED
DEC 28 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 7 --

2
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: EBEL ** , WARDLAW, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Schneider Logistics Transloading and Distribution, Inc. (“SLTD”)
and its parent company, Schneider Logistics, Inc. (“SLI”) (collectively,
“Schneider”), appeal the district court’s grant of two preliminary
injunctions in favor of Appellees, manual laborers at warehouses operated
for Schneider’s benefit.
Schneider argues that the district court erred in entering the
preliminary injunctions against the Schneider entities because they were not
Appellees’ “joint employers.” Schneider also takes issue with the scope of
the injunctions the court issued and challenges them for lack of specificity
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1), and we affirm.
I.
We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645
F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011).
In both injunctive orders, the district court applied the proper tests for
whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction. See Am. Trucking Ass’n,

-- 2 of 7 --

1 Schneider also argues that even if SLTD was a joint employer with Premier and
Impact, SLI, its parent company, was not. Although this appears to be a close
question at this early stage of the litigation, under our deferential standard of
review, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in making this
determination when there is support for its conclusion in the record.
3
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Alliance
for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). We
reject Schneider’s argument that the district court erred when it
incorporated by reference findings it made in a prior order against two of
Schneider’s codefendants; the court’s findings would have been nearly
identical if conducted separately as to Schneider. See Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Enforma Natural Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We
may affirm if the findings are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to
the issues to provide a basis for decision or if there can be no genuine
dispute about the omitted findings.”).
The court also did not err in determining that Schneider was
Appellees’ “joint employer,” and was thus within its discretion to conclude
that Appellees’ probability of success on the merits of their claims was
high. See Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir.
2003); Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2009); Martinez
v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 286-87 (Cal. 2010). 1

-- 3 of 7 --

4
Schneider makes two additional arguments as to why it was improper
for the court to grant the preliminary injunctions against the Schneider
entities. First, Schneider claims that the court erred by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing where the case “turn[ed] on the resolution of bitterly
disputed facts.” Next, Schneider contests the district court’s determination
that Appellees would likely succeed on the merits of their retaliation claims
against Schneider. However, after careful consideration, we find these
arguments to be without merit.
II.
Regarding the scope of the injunctions, Schneider contends that (1)
the district court improperly compelled it to keep records on or “retain”
Appellees, none of whom Schneider employed directly prior to this
litigation; and (2) the court’s orders failed to articulate Schneider’s duties
with the requisite specificity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
A.
Contrary to Schneider’s assertion, the district court never compelled
Schneider to keep duplicative records on Appellees. In its first injunctive
order, the court “[found] it necessary to include SLTD and SLI in the
Preliminary Injunction in order to ensure compliance and to protect

-- 4 of 7 --

5
plaintiffs from irreparable harm.” Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc.
(Carrillo I), No. 11–8557, 2011 WL 6104839, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
2011) (emphasis added); accord Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34
(1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]here may be multiple ‘employers’ who are
simultaneously liable for compliance with the FLSA.”). This did not
amount to an order that Schneider “engage in recordkeeping,” and there is
no evidence in the record to suggest that Schneider has been ordered to
maintain records for individuals it does not directly employ.
Furthermore, Schneider’s contention that the court “compel[led]
SLTD to ‘retain’ the workers” mischaracterizes as a directive what the
district court presented as a choice. In enjoining the planned termination of
Premier’s workers, the court extended to the parties the following options:
the “defendants could comply with the terms of [the second] injunction by
reinstating the service contract [between SLTD and Premier], [or]
Schneider could also comply by retaining the workers directly or
otherwise.” Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc. (Carrillo II),
No. 11–8557, 2012 WL 556309, at *5 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012). We do
not view the options presented by the district court to be an abuse of its
“broad powers and wide discretion to frame the scope of appropriate

-- 5 of 7 --

6
equitable relief” when issuing a preliminary injunction to preserve the
status quo. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. United Fin. Grp., Inc., 474 F.2d 354,
358–59 (9th Cir. 1973).
B.
Schneider’s final argument is that the injunctions fail under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(d) because they do not “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act
or acts restrained or required.” “Challenges to an injunction pursuant to
rule 65(d) are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Holtzman, 762 F.2d
720, 726 (9th Cir. 1985). Under Rule 65, those against whom an injunction
is issued “should receive fair and precisely drawn notice of what the
injunction actually prohibits,” but the court need not provide “explicit
instructions on the appropriate means to accomplish this directive.”
Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1087 (9th Cir.
2004). The Supreme Court has indicated that this requirement is meant to
“avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague
to be understood.” Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974).
In the two orders before us, the district court enjoined (1) illegal
payment, timekeeping, and recordkeeping practices affecting Appellees;
and (2) the mass termination of Premier’s workers. We find the court’s

-- 6 of 7 --

7
orders clear as to “what the injunction[s] actually prohibit[ed].” Fortyune,
364 F.3d at 1087. While we acknowledge that the district court could have
been clearer in articulating Schneider’s specific duties under the
injunctions, as we explained in Fortyune, this does not render the
injunctions invalid under Rule 65(d). Id. at 1087. Our concerns about
clarity are further mitigated by the district court’s demonstrated willingness
to provide clarification where sought.
AFFIRMED.

-- 7 of 7 --