Richard Dean Jenkins v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD DEAN JENKINS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35863
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00849-HA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ancer L. Haggerty, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 7, 2012**
Portland, Oregon
Before: ALARCÓN, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Richard Jenkins appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of his applications for Social Security disability insurance
FILED
NOV 16 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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benefits and Supplemental Security Income payments. Jenkins argues that the
ALJ’s determination that substance abuse was material to his disability was not
supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ gave insufficient weight to the
opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Mihara. Reviewing de novo, we affirm.
Jenkins “bears the burden of proving that [substance abuse] is not a
contributing factor material to his disability.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 748
(9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ properly conducted the five-step inquiry first without
separating out the impact of Jenkins’s drug addiction. See Bustamante v.
Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001). After finding that Jenkins was
disabled, the ALJ conducted the inquiry again, this time evaluating whether
Jenkins would still be disabled absent substance abuse. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1535(b). As the district court explained, Jenkins did not establish that his
physical impairments rendered him disabled absent substance abuse, and “[a]t best,
the evidence is inconclusive as to whether [Jenkins’s] mental impairments
remained disabling after he stopped abusing substances.” “[I]f evidence exists to
support more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the Commissioner’s
decision.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.
2004).

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Although the ALJ gave “significant weight” to Dr. Mihara’s November 2006
opinion, he gave only “little weight” to her April 2009 opinion. The latter opinion
was contradicted by the opinion of an examining psychologist. The ALJ gave
“‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record”
for giving little weight to Dr. Mihara’s April 2009 opinion. See Lester v. Chater,
81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.

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