FRANK SANES, Jr. v. Budget Finance Company;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANK SANES, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BUDGET FINANCE COMPANY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-56943
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-04063-DSF-
FMO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Frank Sanes, Jr., an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Pardi v. Kaiser Found.
FILED
SEP 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-56943 2
Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Sanes failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his claims were barred by
the terms of the settlement agreement in his prior state court action. See id.
(upholding settlement agreement where plaintiff failed to establish that the
agreement was procured by economic duress or any other basis that would render it
invalid).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sanes’ motion for
reconsideration because Sanes failed to raise his contention that the settlement
agreement was void as a matter of public policy in his opposition to summary
judgment. See Novato Fire Prot. Dist. v. United States, 181 F.3d 1135, 1141 n.6
(9th Cir. 1999) (“A district court has discretion to decline to consider an issue
raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration.”). Further, Sanes’ failure
to raise this issue in his opposition waives his right to do so on appeal. See id.
Sanes’ appeal of the denial of his request for a temporary restraining order is
moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.
1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of a
preliminary injunction would have no practical consequences, and the issue is
therefore moot).

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10-56943 3
Sanes’ contentions regarding inadequate notice before the district court
granted summary judgment and the sufficiency of defendants’ evidence are
unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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