United States of America v. Aldin Ray Two Moons Sr.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for**
the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALDIN RAY TWO MOONS SR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-30228
D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00118-JDS-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 8, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI,
District Judge.**
Defendant Aldin Ray Two Moons, Sr. (“Two Moons”) appeals his sentence
of fifty-seven months of imprisonment for two counts of domestic assault by a
FILED
JUN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The district court sentenced Two Moons to concurrent terms of fifty-seven1
months of imprisonment for Count 1 and eleven months of imprisonment for
Count 2, for a total sentence of fifty-seven months.
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habitual offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 117(a). We have1
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Ocampo, 664 F.3d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam). We apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to a district court’s
findings of fact. United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2011).
“There is an intracircuit conflict as to whether the standard of review for
application of the Guidelines to the facts is de novo or only for abuse of
discretion[.]” Id. at 896 n.5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
conflict, however, does not affect the outcome of this case because we would reach
the same result under either standard.
First, Two Moons argues that the district court’s imposition of a two-level
enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”)
§ 2A6.2(b)(1)(D) for a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening,
harassing, or assaulting the same victim constituted impermissible double counting
because the Government relied on the same underlying incidents in the

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Although § 117(a) does not require that the victim in the prior offenses be2
the same person as the victim in the charged offense, both counts of the Indictment
alleged that Two Moons “intentionally assaulted a person with whom the
defendant has cohabitated and shares children in common, after having been
convicted of at least two prior separate assaults against said person[.]” [Excerpts
of Record (“ER”) at 22-23.]
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indictment. Two Moons, however, concedes that the district court applied the2
appropriate guideline, USSG § 2A6.2, and that the imposition of a two-level
enhancement pursuant to § 2A6.2(b)(1)(B) for the infliction of bodily injury was
warranted. Even assuming arguendo that, in applying § 2A6.2(b)(1)(D), the
district court considered the same prior assaults that the Government relied upon in
the Indictment, this was not impermissible double counting. See United States v.
Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[t]here is nothing wrong with double
counting when it is necessary to make the defendant’s sentence reflect the full
extent of the wrongfulness of his conduct” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in Pham)). Two Moons’ pattern of assaulting Tonya Russette
could be used to enhance his sentence pursuant to § 2A6.2(b)(1)(D) because the
base offense level set in § 2A6.2(a) did not take that pattern into account and did
not capture the full extent of the wrongfulness of Two Moons’ behavior. See
United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1993). We therefore affirm
the district court’s imposition of the two-level enhancement pursuant to
§ 2A6.2(b)(1)(D) for “a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening,

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harassing, or assaulting the same victim[.]”
Second, Two Moons challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level
enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. According to
the Presentence Report (“PSR”), on or before May 3, 2011, Two Moons mailed
two envelopes containing three letters he wrote to Russette. He addressed one
envelope to Russette and the other to their five-year-old daughter. Also, on or
before May 17, 2011, Two Moons mailed Russette a copy of her written statement
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated October 13, 2010, with Two Moons’
handwritten comments on it. [PSR at ¶¶ 21-25.] The district court found that these
letters were “more or less . . . a threat” and that Two Moons intended to affect
Russette’s testimony. [ER at 14.] Based on the history of abuse in their
relationship and the specific content of the letters, the district court’s finding was
not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court’s imposition of the
two-level obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Two Moons’ sentence.

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