Lawrence Roy Beck v. Mark Nooth

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE ROY BECK,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
MARK NOOTH,
Respondent - Appellant.
No. 11-35391
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00636-KI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Garr M. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2012
Portland, Oregon
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, TALLMAN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Respondent-appellant Mark Nooth, Superintendent of the Snake River
Correctional Institution, appeals the district court’s grant of petitioner-appellee
Lawrence Roy Beck’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his conviction
for multiple crimes, including four counts of attempted murder of law enforcement
FILED
MAY 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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officers with a firearm in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.405, 163.115, and
161.610. Notwithstanding the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), the district court held that Beck was denied effective assistance of counsel
when Beck’s trial counsel failed to move for a competency hearing before allowing
Beck to plead guilty, and that Beck was denied due process when the trial court did
not sua sponte order such a hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
and we reverse.
The district court erred in holding that the state court’s determination that
Beck’s trial counsel was not ineffective was an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Based on the transcript and
the trial counsel’s affidavit, the state court could reasonably determine that Beck
had “(1) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him,
and (2) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming that the district court properly
considered the Pre-Sentence Report and the psychological evaluation, Beck has
failed to present evidence showing that trial counsel’s performance was so clearly
ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that no

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fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s conclusion to the contrary. See
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
The district court also erred in its holding that there was no reasonable basis
to support the state court’s rejection of Beck’s due process claim. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1). The state post-conviction review court held that there was insufficient
evidence before the trial judge to raise a “bona fide doubt” as to Beck’s
competence to stand trial. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). The
record supports that conclusion, even considering all the information then available
to the trial court, and Beck has therefore not shown that the state court’s
determination was so objectively unreasonable that habeas relief is warranted. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000).
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to DENY the
application for federal habeas relief.

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