Elmer Cotton v. City of Las Vegas; Clark County Treasurer

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELMER COTTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LAS VEGAS; CLARK
COUNTY TREASURER,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16742
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00492-RLH-
PAL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Elmer Cotton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action concerning the City’s demolition of structures on his
property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the
FILED
JAN 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

10-16742 2
district court’s summary judgment and statute of limitations determination.
Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as untimely Cotton’s claims concerning
the City’s alleged failure to provide proper notice regarding the demolition of
structures on his property and the assessment of abatement fees because Cotton
filed this action more than two years after his claims accrued. See Fink v. Shedler,
192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999) (federal courts apply the forum state’s personal
injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims); Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426
(9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Nevada’s statute of limitations for personal injury
claims is two years) (citing Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e)). Furthermore, Cotton
failed to establish a basis for equitable tolling, see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.250
(Nevada’s tolling statute), or equitable estoppel, see Cheqer, Inc. v. Painters &
Decorators Joint Comm., Inc., 655 P.2d 996, 998-99 (Nev. 1982) (listing elements
of equitable estoppel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cotton’s motion to
conduct discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial
court’s broad discretion to deny discovery “will not be disturbed except upon the
clearest showing that [the] denial of discovery result[ed] in actual and substantial

-- 2 of 3 --

10-16742 3
prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Cotton’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --