Myrna Lim v. City and County of San Francisco;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Lim’s request
for oral argument is denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MYRNA LIM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16269
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05083-CRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Myrna Lim appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
action arising under various federal, state, and local laws, alleging numerous
FILED
JAN 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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causes of action against the City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco
Ethics Commission and members of that Commission. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal, Knievel v.
ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lim’s First Amendment claim because
Lim failed to allege facts sufficient to show that her expressive conduct was a
motivating factor for the alleged adverse action. See Marez v. Bassett, 595 F.3d
1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010).
The district court properly dismissed Lim’s equal protection claim because
Lim failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted with the intent to
discriminate against her on the basis of her membership in a protected class or that
she was similarly situated to candidates who received public funding. See
Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005).
The district court properly dismissed Lim’s due process claim because Lim
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she had any constitutionally protected
interest in her reputation. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 373 (9th
Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The district court properly dismissed Lim’s malicious prosecution claim as
time-barred. See Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981) (a malicious

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prosecution action accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or should
know that the action has been terminated in her favor).
The district court properly dismissed Lim’s conspiracy claim because the
insufficiency of her allegations “to support a section 1983 violation precludes a
conspiracy claim predicated upon the same allegations.” Cassettari v. Nevada
County, Cal., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Lim’s complaint
without leave to amend because Lim conceded at oral argument that there were no
additional facts that she knew of which she could include in her amended
complaint. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1995)
(dismissal without leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where amendment
would be futile).
Lim’s remaining contentions, including those concerning her state and local
law claims, are unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Appellees’ request for judicial notice, filed on January 12, 2011, is granted.
AFFIRMED.

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