Kazenercom Too; v. Ibar Development, LLC;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAZENERCOM TOO; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
IBAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
YERKIN AKKUZOV; et al.,
Third-party-defendant -
Appellees,
________________________________
WELLS FARGO BANK NA,
Third-party-defendant.
No. 09-56329
D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00059-JVS-
MLG
MEMORANDUM*
KAZENERCOM TOO; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
No. 10-55458
D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00059-JVS-
MLG
FILED
DEC 27 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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YERKIN BEKTAYEV,
Plaintiff-counter-defendant -
Appellee,
v.
ANATOLY VANETIK, (“TONY”),
Defendant - Appellant,
________________________________
IBAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC; et al.,
Defendants,
TURAN PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant-counter-defendant,
and
KANET MEIRMANOV,
Plaintiff-third-party-plaintiff,
and
YERKIN AKKUZOV; et al.,
Third-party-defendant.
BERIK BEKTAY, No. 10-55922

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Plaintiff - Appellant,
YERKIN BEKTAYEV; et al.,
Plaintiff-counter-defendant-
third party plaintiff - Appellants,
and
KAZENERCOM TOO; et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TURAN PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant-counter-defendant
- Appellee,
and
TREK RESOURCES, INC.; et al.,
Defendants,
and
YERKIN AKKUZOV; et al.,
Third-party-defendants.
D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00059-JVS-
MLG
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

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Case Nos. 09-56329 and 10-55458 were argued and submitted**
December 8, 2011. This panel unanimously concludes Case No. 10-55922 is
suitable for decision without oral argument, and that case is therefore submitted
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable James P. Jones, United States District Judge for the***
Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
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Argued and Submitted December 8, 2011**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District Judge.***
We address three related appeals arising from an asset purchase transaction
between Kazenercom TOO (“Kazenercom”) and its affiliates on one hand, and
Turan Petroleum, Inc. (“Turan”) and its affiliates on the other.
I
Kazenercom and its affiliates appeal the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of their Verified Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and Verified
Amended Third-Party Complaint (“ATPC”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e). We review the Rule 12(e) dismissals for abuse of

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Kazenercom filed motions for judicial notice in this appeal on May 26,1
2010 and April 26, 2011. We take judicial notice of the documents referenced in
the May 26, 2010 motion because they arise from the two related appeals, Nos. 10-
55458 and 10-55922. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.
Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). We decline to take judicial notice
of the documents in the April 26, 2011 motion because they are irrelevant to the
issues on appeal. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011).
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discretion, and review de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. We vacate the
dismissals and remand with leave to amend.1
In dismissing the complaints pursuant to Rule 12(e), the district court stated
that “even if dismissal is not warranted under Rule 41(b), it is nonetheless
warranted, at a minimum, under Rule 12(e).” In so concluding, the district court
committed legal error by failing to consider whether dismissal was warranted
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to comply
with a court order the district court must weigh five factors . . . .”). In this case, the
Rule 41(b) factors weigh decisively against dismissal. Dismissal here is
particularly harsh given the viability of Kazenercom’s RICO claims. In addition,
the district court failed to consider less severe alternatives after it found that
Kazenercom failed to comply with its Rule 12(e) order. Nothing in the record
suggests, moreover, that the complaints impeded the court’s ability to manage its

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docket or prejudiced the defendants. Because the district court overlooked these
factors, we must vacate the Rule 12(e) dismissals.
Next, the district court erroneously dismissed the federal RICO claims in the
SAC under Rule 12(b)(6). Although we are not unsympathetic to the district
court’s tedious task of weeding through the operative complaint, we conclude that
the SAC adequately pleads a civil RICO offense and RICO conspiracy. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962(c), (d). Taking as true the factual allegations and reasonable inferences,
the SAC alleges the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, and a conspiracy to do the same. See Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d
541, 545 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). We therefore vacate the dismissal of the
federal RICO claims.
The district court correctly found, however, that the SAC and the ATPC fail
to state a claim under the federal securities laws. First, with respect to the alleged
misrepresentation concerning Kazenercom’s majority stake in Turan, both
complaints fail to plead the circumstances of fraud with particularity. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,
552 F.3d 981, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2009). Second, with respect to the alleged
misrepresentation concerning Turan’s stock price, the complaints fail to allege loss
causation. See In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th

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To the extent the SAC and ATPC alleged other federal securities claims2
not addressed here, Kazenercom waived on appeal any dispute with the district
court’s dismissal of such claims.
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Cir. 2008). Third, the complaints fail to state an insider trading claim because they
do not allege with particularity that any plaintiff bought or sold Turan stock
contemporaneously with the alleged insiders. See Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d
666, 670 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed these
claims.2
The district court abused its discretion, however, in denying leave to amend
the SAC and ATPC. Because the Verified First Amended Complaint and the
Verified Third-Party Complaint were the only complaints that any court previously
had dismissed, the SAC and ATPC each constitute only the first failure to cure the
deficiencies identified by the district court. Under these circumstances, denial of
leave to amend was improper. Cf. Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1007 (affirming
dismissal with prejudice after repeated failures to cure deficiencies).
We therefore vacate the dismissals of both complaints, and remand to the
district court. Kazenercom and its affiliates shall have the opportunity to replead
their federal securities law claims against all defendants. Taking into consideration
any amended pleadings, and the well-pleaded RICO claims in the SAC, the district
court must also reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any

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state law claims. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 559, 564-65 (2005); Shames v. California Travel and Tourism Comm’n, 626
F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010).
II
Vanetik appeals the district court’s denial of sanctions against Kazenercom
and its counsel under the PSLRA. Because some of Kazenercom’s claims survive
dismissal, the question of sanctions is not ripe for determination. 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(c)(1). We therefore vacate the district court’s order denying sanctions.
III
Yerkin Bektayev, Berik Bektay, and Kanet Meirmanov (collectively,
“Bektayev”) challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the
interpleader action in favor of Turan. In particular, they argue that the district
court erred in giving preclusive effect to the Nevada state court’s summary
judgment order finding that Bektayev and four colleagues (collectively, “Bektayev
Board”) never constituted the legitimate board of directors of Turan. We review de
novo the district court’s ruling on issue preclusion, and once we determine that it is

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Kazenercom filed motions for judicial notice in this appeal on May 24,3
2011 and November 8, 2011. We decline to take judicial notice of these
documents because they are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. See Trigueros, 658
F.3d at 987.
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available, we review the decision to apply it for abuse of discretion. We affirm in
both respects.3
The Nevada judgment satisfies the criteria for issue preclusion under Nevada
law. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (Nev. 2008). First, the
state and federal actions center on the same issue of which of the competing boards
legally controls Turan. Bektayev waived any argument to the contrary by not
raising it in the district court.
Second, the Nevada judgment was final and on the merits. Bektayev
contends that the relevant judgment is the state court’s prior interlocutory order
finding that the Bektayev Board is illegitimate (“Interlocutory Order”). This
argument has no merit. As Bektayev conceded in district court, the Nevada court’s
summary judgment order reiterated the Interlocutory Order’s findings. Bektayev
does not dispute that the Nevada court’s summary judgment was final and on the
merits.
Third, Bektayev was a party to the Nevada action. The record confirms that
he presented arguments and evidence to show that the Bektayev Board was the

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duly elected board of Turan. Further, the notice of appeal in the Nevada action
was filed by Bektayev on behalf of Turan. See Paradise Palms Cmty. Ass’n v.
Paradise Homes, 505 P.2d 596, 598 (Nev. 1973) (“A party . . . is one who is
directly interested in the subject matter, and had a right to make defense, or to
control the proceeding, and to appeal from the judgment.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Fourth, the Nevada action was actually and necessarily litigated. Bektayev
does not dispute that litigation was necessary. Rather, he asserts that he did not
actually litigate his claim because (1) the Nevada court entered the Interlocutory
Order without holding an evidentiary hearing or permitting discovery, and (2)
subsequently entered summary judgment without giving Bektayev further notice or
a hearing. But the exclusion of Bektayev after the Interlocutory Order is
inconsequential because by that point he had already received a full and fair
opportunity to argue that the Bektayev Board was legitimate. Moreover, whether
Nevada law required the state court to permit discovery or an evidentiary hearing
may be an issue for the Nevada Supreme Court, but it is not a matter for this court
to decide. Absent any indication of the Nevada judgment’s subsequent reversal,
we accept it as valid. See LaForge v. State, Univ. and Cmty. College Sys. of
Nevada, 997 P.2d 130, 134 n.4 (Nev. 2000).

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Because the requirements for issue preclusion are met, we hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Nevada judgment
precludes the argument that the Bektayev Board constitutes the legitimate board of
Turan. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Turan.
In sum, in appeal No. 09-56329, we vacate the dismissals and remand with
leave to replead. In No. 10-55458, we vacate the order denying sanctions as
premature. In No. 10-55922, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this disposition. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.

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