Gloria Janett Vanegas Arrubla v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Glen H. Davidson, Senior District Judge for the U.S.**
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GLORIA JANETT VANEGAS
ARRUBLA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-72764
Agency No. A098-646-894
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 14, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIDSON, Senior
District Judge.**
Petitioner Gloria Janett Vanegas Arrubla (“Vanegas”) seeks review of the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her application for
asylum. She claims that she adequately demonstrated past persecution and a well-
FILED
NOV 16 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion by the
guerilla-terrorist organization FARC, entitling her to asylum. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).
Vanegas first contends that the BIA erred in concluding that she had failed
to advance a political opinion claim before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). We
review the factual findings of the BIA for substantial evidence. Hamazaspyan v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 2009). The BIA stated that Vanegas “only
tangentially mentioned that she went to political meetings,” “never testified that
FARC was aware of her political activities” or sought to harm her because of them,
and failed to explain why threats from FARC were related to her political
activities. The BIA used these points in part to justify its conclusion that Vanegas
failed to establish persecution on account of her political opinion. The record
shows that Vanegas answered questions about her political opinion claim in the
hearings before the IJ. Vanegas gave detailed testimony about her political
participation and her reasons for her belief that FARC persecuted her on account of
her political opinion in her asylum application and her interview with the asylum
officer, which she expressly incorporated in her testimony before the IJ. Thus,
because the BIA claims that Vanegas failed to assert that which she quite clearly

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Vanegas also submitted threatening letters that she claimed to have received1
and which appeared to have been authored by FARC. The BIA gave them “limited
weight” because there was no evidence “that FARC produces such documents . . .
and no way to authenticate the letters.” Yet if the BIA did consider the letters as
admitted in evidence, it is not clear why the fact of her receiving the threats and
their messages to her, rather than their authorship, are not the more salient points.
On remand, the BIA may wish to provide further explanation for its conclusions if
it chooses to discount the letters.
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did assert, its conclusion that Vanegas failed to advance a political opinion claim is
unsupported by substantial evidence.
The BIA also concluded that even if Vanegas had established past
persecution on account of her political opinion, “the fact that she no longer works
for the travel agency is a ‘fundamental change in circumstances’ which would
rebut her presumption of a well-founded fear” of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). Vanegas contests this, and rightly so. It is not at all clear
why FARC, if it had persecuted her on account of her political opinion, would
cease doing so merely because she left the employ of the travel agency. This
conclusion is therefore also unsupported by substantial evidence.
Because several premises on which the BIA ultimately concluded that1
Vanegas should not receive asylum were unsupported by substantial evidence, we
remand this case to the BIA to consider and weigh the evidence in her asylum
application and her interview with the asylum officer in the first instance. See INS

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v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam); Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d
1089, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2009).
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

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